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Strikes as Safety-Valve Institutions 
Ran Chermesh 
The présent study argues for the usefulness of searching 
for factors outside of the sub-system of industrial relations 
as partial causes of stike activity. It treats the industrial 
relations sub-system as an internai part of the overall social 
System, in which strikes are regarded as expressions of 
generalized social tension, i.e., as safety-valve institutions. 
"A strike is defined as a temporary stoppage of work by a group of 
employées (not necessarily members of a union) to express a grievance 
or enforce a demand." (U.S., 1968)l 
This définition was adopted by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
in the U.S. Similar définitions are used by most statistical agencies in the 
world. Implicitly they include two basic assumptions: (1) The strike is 
embedded in the employer-employée relationships ; (2) It is a means, 
used by the employées, to express dissatisfaction and pressure for 
improvements within the framework of the work place. 
This article will attempts to demonstrate the limitations of such an 
approach. It is argued that the above définition of strike and its under-
lying assumptions may be useful in formulating a working définition for 
the purposes of data collection; but is inadéquate in explaining the 
phenomenon of strikes, since it fails to incorporate other than work-
related factors. 
Rather than treat strikes as 
isolated, labor relations linked pat-
terns of behavior, a System ap-
proach is suggested. A System may be defined as "a complex of 
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1
 A similar définition is used by the Central Agency of Statistics in Israël. 
See: Israël (1968:11) 
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éléments or components directly or indirectly related in a causal 
network, such that each component is related to at least some others 
in a more or less stable way within any particular period of time." 
(Buckley, 1967: 41) This approach may allow us to introduce extra-
labor-relations factors as déterminants of strike activity. 
An important effort towards analyzing labor relations in the frame-
work of a System approach was made by J.T. Dunlop in his book 
"Industrial Relation Systems." (Dunlop, 1958) Dunlop argues for the 
fruitfulness of assuming the existence of an Industrial Relations Sub-
system, as a distinctive analytical and theoretical subject matter. "The 
industrial-relations System is not coterminus with the économie System ; 
in some respects the two overlap and in other respects both hâve 
différent scopes." (Dunlop, 1958: 5) Dunlop is interested in three main 
relations: Those between (1) the industrial relation sub-system and 
society ; (2) between the industrial relations sub-system and the économ-
ie sub-system, and (3) within the industrial relation System itself. (Dun-
lop, 1958: 7) Dunlop's Systems approach will be applied in the présent 
study to the relations between the industrial relations and the political 
sub-systems. D. Easton, in his article, "A System Analysis of Political 
Life," (Easton, 1968) as well as in his other writings, présents the 
relations between the political sub-system and its environment (the other 
sub-system of a given society and other extra-societal units) in terms of 
inputs and outputs. One units's input is the other's output. He divides 
the inputs into the political sub-system into two main catégories: 
(1) Support; and (2) Demands. Thèse two kinds of inputs are trans-
formed through a conversion process into the political sub-system's 
output, i.e., authority décisions. Being a study of the political aspects of 
labor relations this essay will try to show the existence of another set 
of demands-support, the one in which demands are referred to the 
employers, who hold positions in the industrial relations sub-system, 
while the support remains an input into the political sub-system. 
Strikes may be conceived as political weapons. In order to be a 
political tool, utilized in a class conflict context, the organizers of 
strikes may be expected to be members of opposition parties or frac-
tions. Intra-party disagreements, in gênerai, and splits between trade-
unions and the labor party's leadership in particular, may provoke 
strike activity. The relationships between the government and the Gen-
eral Fédération of Labour (Histadrut) leadership in Israël hâve been 
continually coopérative. The Zionistic ideology served as an integrative 
mechanism. The interests of the state and its biggest voluntary organiza-
tion were believed to be identical, at least in the long run. This cooper-
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ation was nourished by the fact that coalition parties succeeded in 
maintaining a constant majority in the Histadrut ail along independence 
years. The united front of government and trade union movement was 
enforced by the Histadrut majority continually held by the main labor 
party. Table 1 shows the results for five General Fédération of Labour 
national conventions. The information presented covers ail the élections 
which took place during Israel's years of independence. 
TABLE 1 
General Fédération of Labour in Israël : Elections Results of Five 
National Conventions (1949-1969) 
CONVENTION 
VII VIII IX X XI 
Year 1949 1955 1959 1965 1969 
Government coalition parties 97% 65% 94% 83% 71% 
Main party 57% 58% 55% 51% 62% 
Number of votes (-000) 139 410 481 655 621 
Source: HaHistadrut (1971: 93) 
In this context, strikes can hardly be expected to function as 
premeditated political means. 
The corporation of intra-industrial relations sub-system's demands 
and political support in the same model is derived from Coser's 
system's approach. (Coser, 1957, 1964) Coser develops the idea that the 
real déterminant of conflict in a given situation is not necessarily 
rooted in the relationship between interacting partners. Conflict may 
sometimes reflect tension originating from outside the limited range of 
relations. It may serve as a safety valve institution. "We propose to 
use the term safety-valve institutions to dénote institutions which serve 
to divert feelings of hostility into substitute objects (or which provide 
substitute means for such diversion), or which function as channels for 
cathartic release, and not to use it to dénote institutions which provide 
the carrying out of direct conflict." (Coser, 1964: 164). 
In Merton's (Merton, 1963: 51) terms, safety valve institutions may 
hâve a latent functions of tension-release. 
Speaking of safety valve institutions in the plural and not in the 
singular implies the adoption of another Mertonion concept, i.e., the 
concept of functional alternatives. (Merton, 1964: 34) Social tension may 
originate in many friction or frustration contexts and may be expressed 
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through many channels, each serving functionally as a safety valve 
institution. 
Adopting the above gênerai définition of safety valve institution, 
a working définition is to be developed and a set of hypothèses to be 
tested. 
The two following hypothèses focus at two différent aspects of the 
functional approach. The first hypothesis tests the implications of imput-
ing a latent function of tension release to strike activity, while the 
second hypothesis is derived from the assumption of functional alter-
natives. 
Working définition Safety Valve Institutions express tensions 
originally generated in sphères other than those directly involved in 
conflict situation. Assumption 1 : Strikes function as safety valve institu-
tions. They serve to channel tensions originating outside of the industrial 
relations sub-system of a society. 
Hypothesis 1 : Changes in the tension level outside of the industrial 
relation sphère will be expressed as changes in the levels of strike 
activity. A relative increase (decrease) in the level of social tension will 
lead to a conséquent increase (decrease) of strike activity. 
Hypothesis 2 : The observed pattern2 of strike activity is dépendent 
on the level of social tension, through the intervening factor of 
alternative safety valve institutions existing in a given society. 
The more exclusive strike activity is as a safety valve institution, 
the more extrême will be the déviations from a given strike pattern. 
This latter strike pattern is conceptually independent of social 
tension, since it is defined by factors within the industrial relations 
sub-systems. 
THE STUDY 
The testing of the two hypothèses was divided into two stages. 
In the first one, which is based on Israeli data only, strike activity and 
social tension were measured independently. After controlling for the 
secular trend for strike activity, under the assumption that it is 
2
 The term pattern is used hère following Kerr and Siegel. Their patterns are 
combinations of two basic ratios-the membership involvement ratio and the strike 
duration ratio. See KERR, C. (1954). 
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predominately determined by intra-industrial relations sub-system 
factors, the corrélation between strike activity and social tension was 
computed. This corrélation coefficient is regarded hère as a measure of 
the co-variation of the two social processes. Strike related issues were 
excluded from measures of social tension. By so doing, possible 
spurious relationships between strike activity and social tension was 
avoided.3 Three sets of régression équations, based on différent time 
lags were used in order to test the hypothesis of true causal relationship 
between the above two social phenomena and show its direction. 
The second stage is a tentative and incomplète attempt to test 
hypothesis 2. It is based on data collected in nine countries over 
the period between 1958 and 1967. An adéquate research design for 
testing this hypothesis should incorporate measures of at least three 
variables : 
1. Availability of safety valve institutions 
2. Social tension 
3. Strike activity. 
The Israeli data bank is the only one which incorporâtes crude 
measures of variables 1 and 2 and a detailed one for 3. For the other 
countries only strike activity measures were available. 
STAGE 1 : STRIKES AND NEWSPAPER HEADLINES 
Two sets of data were collected independently for the years 1960-
1962 in Israël:4 
1. The number of workers going on strikes in a given month. 
2. Topics, by months, of the editorials published in Israel's most 
popular evening newspaper — Ma'ariv. 
3
 None of the issues included in the analysis had a face appearance of a dispute 
between the Government and the Histadrut. 
4
 The period of three years covered by this study, is as typical and as a typical 
as any other possible time sample. Politically, three main events overshadow public 
discussions: gênerai élections, dévaluation of the Israeli Lira (IL) and «The Affair». 
The first two issues occur almost regularly more than once in each décade, the first 
de-jure and the other de-facto. The third issue is unique in its causes and results, but 
is not a labour relations issue. 
Strike statistics show an almost perfect secular trend of increase in the 
years 1957-1965, three of which précède the time period under study, and the other 
three follow it. The number of workers who took part in strikes or lockouts which 
lasted a day or longer were: 1957-3, 692; 1958-6, 050; 1959-5, 873; 1960-10, 006; 1961-
21, 444; 1962-25, 816; 1963-62, 086; 1964-37, 723; 1965-78, 844, Source: HAMACHON 
(1971). 
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Strike Activity Analysis 
A linear régression line was computed for the number of workers 
engaged in strikes (WES) over a period of time. The régression line 
was found to be WES' = 793.79 = 74.32t where WES' is the expected 
number of workers engaged in strikes, and t is a given month in the 
above period of time. Assuming that the trend of strike activity is 
determined mostly by intra-industrial relation factors, and that the linear 
régression line is a good approximation of thèse factors,5 a new set of 
data was figured out by subtracting the observed figure of WES in a 
given month from the expected one : 
DFTt = W E S t - WESt1 
where DFTt is the déviation from the trend for the month t and WESt is 
the observed number of workers engaged in strikes for month t. See 
Table 2. 
Social Tension Measure 
The editorial headlines of the newspaper Ma'ariv were classified 
by their main topics.6 The modal topic or each month was regarded as 
the single most popular issue of that month. Each of thèse topics was 
coded as expressing either solidarity, conflict or neutrality toward the 
institutional stability of the Israeli society. In cases of ambivalence, the 
editorials and not only their headlines, were-read and coded according 
to their contents. 
What are the topics which were defined as indicating a certain 
degree of social tension? It is felt that for the purposes of the présent 
essay, the discussion of the coding of Israeli-spécifie issues is not vital. 
In gênerai, social tension topics led to or seemed to hâve the potential 
to lead to government crises. For example, they critieized the govern-
ment for not having a clear économie policy or reliable leadership. 
Clean eut policy, supported by the public was regarded as a solid-
arisée topic. 
5
 The linearity assumption is adopted mainly because of expediency reasons. 
Britt and Galle's statement may apply perfectly to our case: «(learly, there is no 
established, integrated theory of union-management conflict from which thèse relation-
ships could be deducted». The linear régression model is adopted hère, implying a 
préférence for simple models when no theoretical reasons lead to more complicated 
ones. See BRITT, D. and GALLE, O. R. (1972: 52). 
6
 For a detailed report of the coding procédure see: R. CHERMESH (1970). 
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CHART 1 
Déviation from the Trend of the Number of Workers 
Involved in Strikes (DFT) and Social Tension 
Measure, Israël —1960-1962 
Findings 
Chart 1 shows the relationships between the social tension measure 
and the déviation from the trend of the number of workers involved in 
strikes (DFT). 
As we can see strikes are more fréquent in times of extra-
industrial stress. The corrélation between DFT and the social tension 
measure* is .50 (Pearson product-moment correlation-r), which means 
that 25% of the variance in the déviations from strike trend is explained 
by the measure of social tension. 
* * The social tension measure was coded as follows : 
1 low tension, solidaristic issues 
0 no clear public issues or neutral issues 
1 high tension, conflict issues 
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The corrélation between strike activity may be interpretect in one 
of three ways : 
(1) A déviation from the expected level of strike activity raises 
the level of social tension. 
(2) Strike activity and social tension, as measured by the con-
tents of editorial headlines, expresses the same type of social 
phenomenon, i.e., social tension. 
(3) Social tensions, as measured by the editorial, finds its relief in 
déviations from the patterns of strike activity. 
Interprétation (1) may be deducted from thèse logical statements : 
a. Strikes interfère with routine. 
b. Strikes threaten to curtail the supply of services. 
c. Each interférence with routine or threatening of services 
curtailment increases tension. 
Interprétation (2) is self-evident. Its theoretical implication is the 
redundancy of the safety valve institutions concept for explaining 
changes in strike activity. 
Interprétation (3) foliows out of our model. 
Testing the three alternative interprétations was done using régres-
sion analysis. 
If interprétation (1) is the correct one, then past déviations from 
trend (DFT) should be better predictors of the current social tension 
level than current DFT. 
If interprétation (3) is the better one, then past social tension 
should be better predictors of the current DFT than curreni: social 
tension. 
If neither interprétation (1) nor interprétation (3) predict better than 
the simple corrélation of DFT and social tension, then interprétation (2) 
is to be preferred. 
TABLE 3 
Multiple Corrélation (R), R2, F Coefficients and Significance Levels for Testing 
the Direction of Causality Between Strikes and Social Tension 
Inte rpretation R R2 F Significance 
(1) Strikes -> Social tension .57 .33 3.538 <.05 
(2) Strikes = Social tension .50 .25 10.775 >.01 
(3) Social tension -* Strikes .79 .62 10.775 >.01 
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Table 3 shows the results of testing the three alternative inter-
prétations. For the purpose of testing interprétation (1) four sets of DFT 
séries were defined as the independent variables. Thèse séries repre-
sented DFT preceding social tension by 1,2,3, and 4 weeks.7 The 
dépendent variable was social tension. This proved to be non-significant, 
though it explained an extra 8% of the variance, as compared with 
interprétation (2). 
For testing interprétation (3), 4 sets of social tension scores were 
computed having a time lag of 1, 2, 3 and 4 weeks.8 This interprétation 
explained 62% of the variance, i.e., 37% more than interprétation (2). 
Explaining the largest proportion of the variance, and being significant 
in the 1% level, makes the hypothesis that strikes in Israël were safety 
valve institutions the best supported interprétation.9 
STAGE 2: STABILITY OF STRIKE PATTERNS AND STRIKES AS SAFETY VALVE 
INSTITUTIONS 
The more isolated is an institutional sphère the more can we expect 
its pattern to be stable. This assumption doesn't contradict the open 
System approach which says that "open Systems also share the charac-
teristics of négative enthropy... The law of négative enthropy states 
that Systems survive and maintain their characteristic internai order only 
so long as they import from the environment more energy than they 
expend in the process of transformation and exportation." (Katz and 
Kahn, 1966: 2) 
This latter approach deals more with conséquences of the long run 
and with transactions of mutual interest. We are dealing with the 
stability of patterns in the short run and with the implications of 
tensions in the environment upon the stability of a pattern in a system. 
We may define the short run of an industrial relations sub-system as 
the period in which only minor changes occur in the économie sub-
system, in its technological potential, and in the internai organization of 
its power relations. 
A period of 10 years may be regarded as a relatively "short run" 
for the industrial sub-system. No major structural changes hâve occur-
7
 The time-lag séries were reproduced assuming an even distribution of DFT 
in each month. 
8
 The time-lag séries were reproduced assuming an even distribution of social 
tension in each month. 
9
 For objections to the use of cross-lagged régression see PELZ (1964) and 
BOHRNSTEDT(1969). 
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red between 1958 and 1967 in any of the 9 countries covered by our 
study. In the absence of such radical intra-sub-system changes, we may 
expect changes in the strike patterns to be incrémental and to follow 
quite a simple trend. It may be expected that unstable strike activity 
patterns will exist in countries where the strike is an important safety 
valve institution, while the change in the patterns will be less pronounced 
and ordered in societies which hâve many other alternative safety 
valve institutions. 
Two main variables are assumed to détermine the stability of 
strike patterns : 
1. The level of social tension. 
2. The availability of alternative safety valve institutions. The 
higher the social tension and the fewer the alternative channels 
for cathartic release of tension, the less can strike patterns be 
expected to be stable. 
Measuring the stability of a pattern requires both measuring the 
pattern itself and its level of stability. 
Measuring the pattern may be pursued by undimensional tech-
niques (number of days lost per year per salaried worker, percent of 
the salaried workers who took part in strikes in a given year, etc.), or by 
multidimensional techniques. (Knowles, 1952; Knowles, 1954; Rimlinge, 
1959; Ross, 1960; Ross, 1951; Spielman, 1944; Britt, 1972). A bi-
dimensional approach is adopted hère. The number of working days 
lost per year per 1,000 salaried workers and the number of workers 
involved in strikes per 1,000 salaried workers were chosen as measures 
of a pattern. A unified Measure of Strike Activity (MSA) was computed 
using the following formula : 
MSAi= VNSSA2j + NDLWf 
where MSA, is the level of strike activity for country i, NSSWi 
is the number of workers involved in strikes per 1,000 salaried 
workers and NDLWi — the number of days lost in strikes per 1,000 
salaried workers. 
MSA is a distance metric. It serves as a measure of strike patterns, 
incorporating simultaneously the intensity (NDLW) and the spread 
(NSSW) of strike activity. 
MSA may be used for measuring the level of strike activity. (See 
Table 5, col. 4). For the years 1958-1967, Italy's average score is the 
highest (353), while West Germany's is the lowest (20). The ten coun-
tries may be divided conveniently into 4 groups : 
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TABLE 4 
Combined Measure of Strike Activity (MSA) by Country and Year 
Year 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Australia 171.00 138.12 290.19 202.05 185.94 215.13 306.93 261.95 218.69 219.10 
Canada 152.95 34.78 252.20 135.77 121.67 225.28 111.42 5.46 435.58 223.32 
France 115.64 82.15 121.87 51.00 55.70 261.81 42.91 127.21 96.82 135.68 
G. Britain 25.60 106.73 14.33 17.64 195.25 76.30 50.29 24.46 52.76 33.12 
Israël 59.70 155.32 115.59 33.11 233.75 79.31 47.63 134.39 75.24 116.41 
Italy 578.24 114.53 431.46 80.82 1110.62 132.61 210.48 331.83 339.13 199.96 
Japan 101.63 90.10 33.58 80.98 35.56 75.44 63.32 19.74 90.59 125.77 
Sweden 10.79 7.37 9.82 16.32 15.22 7.99 4.77 15.66 104.86 16.98 
U. S. 16.24 791.50 120.95 172.05 142.76 190.65 88.24 111.24 90.19 137.01 
W. Germany 21.07 15.26 16.37 15.28 3.92 71.22 17.58 16.13 17.27 1.68 
1. Low strike activity: West Germany, Sweden. 
2. Medium-low strike activity: Great Britain, Japan, France and 
Israël. 
3. Medium-high strike activity: Australia, United States, and 
Canada. 
4. High strike activity: Italy. 
The focus of this study, though, is not the level of strike activity 
per se. It is the stability of strike patterns which is our main point of 
interest. As a measure of the pattern stability a Pearson corrélation 
coefficient was compute between MSA and time-pass. We may expect 
this Corrélation to be higher in those countries that fulfill either or 
both conditions, i. e., where the level of social tension is low and/or 
many alternative safety-valve institutions are available. In thèse coun-
tries the change in strike patterns would not be abrupt, and the dévia-
tions from the time trend should not be high. On the other hand, strike 
TABLE 5 
Mean MSA, corrélation coefficients and coefficients of détermination 
for MSA with time by country 
Country TMSA.t x2MSA.t JMSA 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sweden - .447 .28 21 
Australia .419 .18 221 
U. S. - .342 .12 186 
Italy - .173 .03 353 
France .143 .02 86 
Canada .108 .01 170 
Great Britain - .092 .01 60 
West Germany - .083 .01 20 
Japan .077 .01 72 
Israël - .020 .00 105 
598 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 32, NO 4 
activity may behave as a barometer of social tension in those societies 
where few alternative release channels are available. Table 5 shows the 
figures for the ten countries. Nations differ in their level of social 
tension and the availability of release channels. More information 
is needed in order to distinguish between the two factors which may 
explain the higher corrélations in Sweden, Australia, and the U. S. It 
can, however, be said quite safely that in thèse countries a rela-
tively high percentage of the strike pattern variance may be explained 
in terms of intra-industrial relation system's factors. It should be 
emphasised that this conclusion is independent of the level of strike 
activity. Sweden* has one of the lowest scores in strike activity, while 
Australia and the U. S. exhibit almost the highest**. For the other 
countries, the corrélation coefficients between MSA and time are very 
low, and they explain no more than 2% of the variance. The industrial 
Systems of thèse countries may be regarded as tied intensively into 
their political subsystems. Strike patterns in Israël, Japan, West 
Germany, Great Britain, Canada, France, and Italy are most probably 
indicative of industrial unrest serving as safety-valve institutions. 
Israël has the lowest corrélation coefficient (r = .02). The results 
of the first stage of the study showed a relatively high corrélation 
(r = .50) between social tension and déviations from strike patterns. 
The conclusions of the first stage emphasized the importance of social 
tension in explaining instability of strike patterns in Israël. 
EXPLANATION 
Which normative and institutional factors in the Israeli society may 
yield findings like the above ? 
1. Israël has a very stable political establishment. For the 25 years 
of independence, and for at least 25 years before then, the Jewish 
community has has the same political leadership. Any direct political 
activity has been ineffective in expressing social dissent. Such political 
establishment stability calls for the need for safety valve institutions. 
* 'NSA.t approaches 0 when there is no change in the level of strike activity 
over time. For the purpose of this paper no change is a case of perfect stability. 
Sweden is the only example which approaches this kind of stability. Its strike pattern, 
though, is of some tranquil years, followed by one year of high to moderate strike 
activity. I would like to thank Professor P. Bonacich for indicating this limitation of 
my procédure. 
** Kendall's Tau rank order corrélation between rMSA.t and *MSA is -.244. 
Z(Tau = -.224, n = 10) = .984, which is not significant. 
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2. Israël is a country under constant siège. Military issues are regard-
ed as tabooes. Any use of défense issues for the expression of internai 
conflict is normatively condemned. 
3. The Israeli society emphasized the idéal of ingathering. Any ethnie 
conflict is regarded as illegitimate. 
4. Israël legitimized its économie dependency upon the Jews in the 
Diaspera. The relationships between the State of Israël and the Jews 
ail over the world are believed to be based upon mutual interest. 
Israël supplies the Jews with pride of being a Jew and with a feeling 
of security, while the Jews abroad hâve the obligation to support 
Israël economically. Such values relieve the average Israeli from the 
need for an intensive pursuit of collective self-sufficiency. 
The first characteristic of the Israeli society, its political stability, 
is meaningful in two ways : 
1. The level of social tension in Israël seems to be relatively low. 
Nonrealistic conflict (Coser, 1956: 48-55) cannot keep a political sub-
system forever from changing. The changes which took place in the 
Israeli society before and after its independence are very radical. The 
political establishment could not hâve withstood a constant high social 
pressure. 
2. Such a society may be expected to use intensively safety valve 
institutions. «The need for safety-valve institutions increases with the 
rigidity of social structure, i. e., with the degree to which it disallows 
direct expression of antagonistic claims.» (Coser, 1956:156) 
The second and the third characteristics of the Israeli society — 
the taboo on using military adventures for internai political purposes, 
and the disapproval of ethnie conflict — point to a sélection process 
of safety valve institutions. Potential channels are defined as illegitimate. 
Their use becomes unpopular. 
The fourth characteristic, on the other hand, sheds some light 
on the question why strikes are a primary safety valve institution in 
Israël. Realistic conflicts «arise from frustrations of spécifie demands 
within a relationship and from estimâtes of gains of the participants» 
(Coser, 1956: 156). A conflict situation may or may not be a zéro sum 
game. Industrial strikes are zéro sum games as long as the burden is 
not transferred to the public. Form and Miller, (1960) Chamberlain 
and Schilling (1954) and others showed that no easy transfer of burden 
can be assumed. The social system of the industrial setting includes 
the gênerai public and its agents. As long as the public functions as 
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counterbalancing power, strikes cannot be an effective safety valve 
institution. In a social setting where no such counterbalance exists, 
i. e., where one side can win without forcing the other to lose, strike 
could be employed as a popular safety valve institution. Any strike in 
local products' priées is a defeat of the économie independence goal. 
It threatens the competitory position of the Israeli product in the world 
markets. Normatively this is not regarded as a disloyal act. Economie 
survival is to be reached through the efforts of the Jewish nation ail 
around the world, and not just be the Israelis themselves. Satisfying 
social tension pressure requires a price. An économie price is the least 
worst solution according to this approach. This attitude seemed to 
hâve been true for Israël of the early 1960's. 
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La grève: une soupape de sécurité 
On étudie généralement les grèves en tant que phénomènes se rattachant au 
système des relations industrielles. N'y aurait-il pas lieu de se demander si, jusqu'à un 
certain point, les grèves ne seraient pas l'expression d'un état de tension sociale plus 
généralisé et si elles n'agiraient pas à la manière d'une soupape de sécurité. 
On définit généralement la grève comme un arrêt temporaire du travail par un 
groupe d'employés afin d'exprimer leurs griefs et de faire valoir leurs revendications. 
Ainsi considérée, la grève fait partie du système des relations de travail. Mais cette 
définition, fort valable en matière de statistiques, suffit-elle à expliquer ce phénomène 
à l'intérieur de la société? 
L'étude porte sur l'analyse des statistiques relatives aux grèves dans dix pays 
sur une période de dix ans: Australie, Canada, France, Grande-Bretagne, Israël, Italie, 
Japon, Suède, États-Unis sont identifiés comme des sociétés dans lesquelles l'agitation 
ouvrière est principalement due à des facteurs reliés au système des relations de travail 
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lui-même. En d'autres pays, cependant, les conflits de travail ont tendance à être 
dépendants de facteurs externes. La tension sociale peut exercer une importance dé-
terminante dans la fluctuation des grèves dans ce deuxième groupe. 
La tension sociale peut provenir de frictions ou de frustations et s'extérioriser 
de plusieurs façons. Le concept de soupape de sécurité institutionnel exprime des 
tensions dans des sphères autres que celles du conflit proprement dit, la grève se 
présentant comme une soupape de sécurité pour relâcher des tensions qui se font 
sentir à l'extérieur du système des relations du travail. 
Selon une première hypothèse, des modifications dans le niveau de la tension 
hors des relations de travail se manifestent par des changements dans le nombre et 
l'importance des grèves. Une augmentation ou une diminution du niveau de tension 
sociale donnera lieu conséquemment à une augmentation ou à une diminution des grèves. 
En deuxième hypothèse, la grève est dépendante du niveau de tension sociale compte 
tenu des soupapes de sécurité qui existent dans une société donnée. 
La vérification de ces deux hypothèses s'est faite en deux étapes. Dans la pre-
mière, qui se fonde uniquement sur les statistiques d'Israël, l'action de grève et la 
tension sociale furent mesurées indépendamment l'une de l'autre. La deuxième étape 
a consisté en une tentative pour vérifier la deuxième hypothèse fondée sur les données 
des neuf autres pays entre 1958 et 1967 au moyen de trois variables: la présence d'ins-
titutions agissant comme soupapes de sécurité, le degré de tension sociale et l'action 
de grève. 
Pour Israël, on a fait l'analyse de l'activité de grève, puis on s'est basé sur les 
thèmes des éditoriaux d'un journal populaire pour mesurer le degré de tension sociale, 
en retenant, en particulier, les critiques contre le gouvernement. 
Par cette analyse, on a découvert que les grèves deviennent plus fréquentes 
dans un climat de tension sociale d'où l'on peut s'attendre à ce que le nombre des 
grèves soit plus grand là où la grève constitue une soupape de sécurité importante 
alors qu'il en sera autrement dans les sociétés où il existe d'autres institutions aptes 
à relâcher la tension sociale. 
Le résultat des recherches s'explique, pour Israël, par les caractéristiques sui-
vantes: un niveau de tension sociale relativement bas, le non recours à l'appareil mili-
taire pour le règlement des conflits politiques internes, l'existence de soupapes de 
sécurité efficaces et, parmi celles-ci, le recours à la grève qui paraît jouer un rôle majeur. 
